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The Brake Parts Trade Map: Export Data, Unit Values and the Competition Reshaping the Aftermarket

A data-led map of the global brake-parts trade: export values, unit values, regionalisation and the technology shift reshaping aftermarket competition.

The brake-parts trade is usually described as a single global market. In 2024, 35 reporting economies exported about $37.6 billion of goods classified under HS 870830, "brakes and servo-brakes; parts thereof", and how that value is distributed says as much about industrial structure as about price. China is the largest exporter by value and by reported weight, but its unit value is roughly one-third of Germany's and less than one-fifth of Japan's. Mexico and Poland more than doubled exports in nine years, import dependence on China rose in seven of the eight markets examined here, and the installed car fleet still sets the pace of aftermarket demand.

What the data measure, and what they do not

The figures come from UN Comtrade reports (2026) for HS 870830, a mixed basket that includes boosters, calipers, master cylinders, discs, drums and loose parts under one code. Three caveats matter. First, they are a sample of 35 reporting economies, not a world total. Second, unit values are total value divided by total reported net weight, so they reflect product mix and market positioning rather than a measured quality grade. Third, net weights are self-reported, and gross values double-count components as they cross borders (Johnson, 2018). Read the numbers as a map of specialisation, not a scoreboard of quality.

China's lead is a lead in tonnage

Table 1 sets 2024 against 2015 for the largest sample exporters. China's exports rose from $4.701 billion to $8.255 billion, about 22% of the sample total; Germany exported $5.182 billion and Mexico $4.579 billion, with the United States, Japan, Poland and Italy behind them. On value alone China's lead looks decisive. On unit value the picture differs: China's $2.68 per kilogram compares with $7.34 for Germany, $7.49 for Mexico, $8.27 for the United States and $15.25 for Japan.

Exporter2015 exports ($bn)2024 exports ($bn)2015 unit value ($/kg)2024 unit value ($/kg)
China4.7018.2552.402.68
Germany4.2465.1826.267.34
Mexico1.9824.5797.437.49
United States2.9102.6218.148.27
Poland1.1252.4894.465.12
Italy1.8592.4895.666.77
Japan1.3431.60010.4715.25
Czechia1.6031.5468.216.96
India0.2540.8365.903.84

China reported more than four times Germany's net weight and roughly ten times that of the United States, so its value lead is built on volume rather than price per kilogram — the profile of a mid-tier, high-volume exporter with a broad catalogue of standard parts. The high-value tier — Germany, Japan, the United States and Mexico — still exports at unit values roughly 2.7 to 5.7 times China's, consistent with more complex assemblies, tighter specifications and OEM-linked supply.

The high-value tier has moved up, unevenly

Unit values are not fixed. Between 2015 and 2024, Japan's rose from $10.47 to $15.25 per kilogram, a 46% increase; Germany's from $6.26 to $7.34, and Poland's from $4.46 to $5.12. China's rose only from $2.40 to $2.68, about 12%, so its export growth came overwhelmingly from volume. Others moved the other way: India's fell from $5.90 to $3.84 while its export value more than tripled, and Czechia's from $8.21 to $6.96.

The trade literature treats export prices as informative about quality upgrading, though prices also move with product mix. Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015), using Chinese transaction data for 2000 to 2006, found that firms facing input-tariff cuts raised both imported-input prices and export prices, a pattern consistent with quality upgrading. The changes above suggest the mix effect the data cannot separate: Japan and the UK moved up-market, India and Czechia toward cheaper products, and China's modest increase fits a volume-led strategy rather than a quality leap.

Mexico and Poland: the assembly-platform decade

The fastest growers were not the largest incumbents. Mexico's exports rose 131% and Poland's 121%; India's rose 229% from a much smaller base, and Slovakia and Thailand grew by more than half. At the other end, US exports fell about 10%, Czechia and France were flat to lower, and Korea and the United Kingdom declined by about a fifth.

This is the regionalisation pattern that global-value-chain research describes. Sturgeon et al. (2008) argued that local-content pressure pushes automotive production close to end markets, where it is organised nationally or regionally. Russo et al. (2023), analysing 25 years of automotive-parts trade, found denser, more hierarchical networks built around Germany's EU trade and the US agreements with Canada and Mexico, alongside the surge of China. Mexico and Poland fit that description: assembly platforms adjacent to large markets, growing faster than the countries they supply.

Value capture is a separate question. Crossa and Ebner (2020) argue that Mexico's automotive growth has been an export-platform model concentrated in northern border states, reliant on transnational capital and specialised in labour-intensive, lower-value-added segments. The data cannot settle that debate, but are consistent with it: Mexico's unit value barely moved between 2015 and 2024 even as export value more than doubled. Ambroziak (2016) documents the European variant: in six Central European economies, intra-industry trade expanded alongside foreign investment, with countries exchanging similar products at different quality levels.

Import dependence deepened almost everywhere except the United States

Table 2 turns the map around, again using UN Comtrade data. Between 2015 and 2024, the Chinese share of brake-parts imports rose in seven of the eight markets examined: Germany from 7.0% to 13.8%, Poland from 9.6% to 21.0%, Mexico from 14.3% to 23.1%, Italy from 17.1% to 24.8%, France from 3.6% to 11.2%, Spain from 9.8% to 12.5%, and Japan from 51.7% to 56.0%. Only the United States saw its Chinese share fall, from 31.5% to 25.0%, even though its total imports grew 42%.

Importer2015 imports ($bn)2024 imports ($bn)China share 2015China share 2024
United States5.2517.44831.5%25.0%
Germany3.4274.5837.0%13.8%
Japan0.5680.75651.7%56.0%
Mexico1.8302.96814.3%23.1%
Poland0.7211.5549.6%21.0%
Italy0.8581.08417.1%24.8%
France1.3541.4763.6%11.2%
Spain0.6370.8099.8%12.5%

Two readings are tempting and both are too simple. One is that trade policy has reduced dependence: the US number supports it, no other market does. The other is that dependence is uniform: Japan already sourced more than half its brake-parts imports from China in 2015, while Germany sourced only 7%. A third reading fits better: trade is being re-routed rather than replaced. The fastest-growing exporters, Mexico and Poland, also raised their Chinese import shares sharply — what regional assembly platforms look like when plugged into Asian component supply, exporting more finished parts and importing more of the inputs.

Valuation also differs: exports are reported free on board and imports include cost, insurance and freight, so the table is not a trade balance.

The installed fleet is the aftermarket's centre of gravity

Trade flows describe supply; replacement demand follows the vehicles already on the road. Eurostat data put the EU27 passenger-car fleet at 221.7 million in 2013 and 260.2 million in 2024, an increase of 38.5 million cars, or 17.4%. Over the same period the battery-electric share of new car registrations rose from 0.42% in 2015 to 14.53% in 2023, then slipped to 13.52% in 2024.

That last number matters for the aftermarket. A 13.5% share of new sales is not a 13.5% share of the fleet: the fleet is the accumulation of more than a decade of registrations, most of them combustion vehicles. Replacement demand therefore continues to be dominated by conventional hydraulic brake hardware, boosters, master cylinders, calipers, discs and drums, for years after the new-sales mix has changed. Globally, electric car sales exceeded 17 million in 2024, more than 20% of sales, and are set to exceed 40% by 2030 under today's policy settings (IEA, 2025). The transition is real, but it is a new-sales and production phenomenon before it is a fleet phenomenon. Laborda and Moral (2020) add the methodological point: aftermarket forecasts that extrapolate the past are unreliable when usage and technology are changing.

The technology split inside the part number

The powertrain transition changes what is bolted to the firewall. A vacuum booster needs a vacuum source, historically the engine's intake manifold; a battery-electric vehicle has none, which is why electro-hydraulic brake systems have been developed to replace it, with faster pressure build-up and continuous electronic pressure regulation (Han et al., 2023). Further out, electro-mechanical braking replaces hydraulic actuation at the wheel, driven by electrification and vehicle intelligence (Li et al., 2023).

Friction braking does not disappear, but its duty cycle changes. Regenerative braking recovers energy that friction brakes would turn into heat, so the friction pair does less work in normal driving; meanwhile brake wear becomes a larger share of traffic-related particulate emissions as exhaust controls tighten. Grigoratos and Martini (2014) report that exhaust and non-exhaust sources contribute almost equally to traffic-related PM10, that brake wear can account for up to 55% by mass of non-exhaust PM10 in urban environments, and that its relative importance rises as exhaust emissions fall. That is a materials and regulatory trend, not a demand collapse.

For the aftermarket, the consequence is a split. The 260-million-car European fleet, and comparable stocks, will keep demanding conventional vacuum and hydraulic boosters, vacuum pumps, master cylinders, calipers and discs for years, while new platforms move toward electric assist and brake-by-wire. That split is visible in published product ranges: FIVER, for example, lists vacuum power brake boosters, hydraulic (hydro-boost) boosters, booster vacuum pumps, calipers, master cylinders and brake discs and drums, with caliper housings offered in nodular graphite cast iron, aluminum casting and aluminum forging.

What this means for competition

Three competitive layers emerge. The volume layer, China, Poland, Spain and India, competes on scale, catalogue breadth and cost, at the sample's lowest unit values. The high-value layer, Germany, Japan and the United States, competes on specification, complex assemblies and OEM-linked engineering, and its unit values are roughly three to six times higher. The regional-platform layer, Mexico, Czechia, Slovakia and Thailand, competes on proximity and trade access, and captures export value partly by importing components from lower-cost producers. Competition is therefore a contest between layers, and the boundaries move when a country upgrades its mix, a trade agreement reroutes components, or technology changes what a part must do.

What to watch

Four indicators will show which way the map moves.

  • China's unit value. A sustained rise would signal a move up the mix; flat unit values with rising volume would signal continued scale competition.
  • The US-China share. Whether it stabilises near 25% or keeps falling, and how much of the shift reappears in Mexico's imports from China.
  • The EU battery-electric share after its 2024 dip, and fleet growth, because the stock rather than the showroom determines replacement demand.
  • The pace of electric assist and brake-by-wire moving from new platforms into the volume segments that the aftermarket serves.

The brake-parts trade follows the fleet; the open question is which layer of the supply chain captures the next increment of growth, and in which technology.

References

  1. Ambroziak, Ł. (2016). FDI and intra-industry trade in the automotive industry in the new EU member states. International Journal of Management and Economics, 52(1), 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1515/ijme-2016-0025
  2. Bas, M., & Strauss-Kahn, V. (2015). Input-trade liberalization, export prices and quality upgrading. Journal of International Economics, 95(2), 250–262. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2014.12.005
  3. Crossa, M., & Ebner, N. (2020). Automotive global value chains in Mexico: A mirage of development? Third World Quarterly, 41(7), 1218–1239. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1761252
  4. Grigoratos, T., & Martini, G. (2014). Brake wear particle emissions: A review. Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 22(4), 2491–2504. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-014-3696-8
  5. Han, W., Xiong, L., Yu, Z., Zhuo, G., Leng, B., & Xu, S. (2023). Integrated pressure estimation and control for electro-hydraulic brake systems of electric vehicles considering actuator characteristics and vehicle longitudinal dynamics. IEEE/ASME Transactions on Mechatronics, 28(1), 197–209. https://doi.org/10.1109/TMECH.2021.3119414
  6. Johnson, R. C. (2018). Measuring global value chains. Annual Review of Economics, 10(1), 207–236. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080217-053600
  7. Laborda, J., & Moral, M. J. (2020). Automotive aftermarket forecast in a changing world: The stakeholders' perceptions boost! Sustainability, 12(18), Article 7817. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12187817
  8. Li, C., Zhuo, G., Tang, C., Xiong, L., Tian, W., Qiao, L., Cheng, Y., & Duan, Y. (2023). A review of electro-mechanical brake (EMB) system: Structure, control and application. Sustainability, 15(5), Article 4514. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15054514
  9. Russo, M., Alboni, F., Carreto Sanginés, J., De Domenico, M., Mangioni, G., Righi, S., & Simonazzi, A. (2023). Regionalisation and cross-region integration: Twin dynamics in the automotive international trade networks. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 67, 98–114. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2023.07.006
  10. Sturgeon, T. J., Van Biesebroeck, J., & Gereffi, G. (2008). Value chains, networks and clusters: Reframing the global automotive industry. Journal of Economic Geography, 8(3), 297–321. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbn007
  11. Eurostat (2026). Passenger cars by age (road_eqs_carage) and new passenger cars by type of motor energy (road_eqr_carpda) [data sets]. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/road_eqs_carage/default/table https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/road_eqr_carpda/default/table
  12. International Energy Agency (2025). Global EV Outlook 2025: Executive summary. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2025/executive-summary
  13. United Nations Statistics Division (2026). UN Comtrade Database: HS 870830 exports and imports, 2015–2024 [data set; public preview API]. https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS

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